Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment

57 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2008 Last revised: 22 Apr 2012

See all articles by David D. Haddock

David D. Haddock

Northwestern University - School of Law and Department of Economics; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Robert J. Miller

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

A bilateral danger of underperformance exists when two parties sink investments with payoffs dependent on the behavior of the other. There are five general categories of defense against that danger: (1) Legal action against a misbehaving co-investor; (2) Reliance on a reputation for non-opportunistic behavior; (3) Agreement by the party with the less substantial reputation to modify the relative payouts, thus paying the partner a risk premium; (4) Vertical integration that makes a partnership unnecessary; and (5) Forgoing the opportunity altogether. A sovereign can be sued only if it permits that outcome, and must invest in a reputation that assures the partner that it will permit suit. Thus, for a sovereign the first two categories merge. Such a reputation can arise from a history of successful meritorious suits by aggrieved co-investors. But many tribal reservations are small and poor, offer few attractive investment opportunities, and hence exhibit thin histories on point. Consequently they more often pay high risk premiums than similar non-tribal investors, more often vertically integrate where others rely on experts, and more often forego potentially valuable investments altogether. We explore ways to ameliorate those disadvantages and thus improve returns from assets held by or on reservations.

Keywords: tribal economic development, reservation economic development, American Indian economic development, institutions for economic development

JEL Classification: A13, D20, D23, D60, D72, D73, E60, G14, G18, H10, J15, K20, O10, O20, P00, P40, R00, Z10

Suggested Citation

Haddock, David D. and Miller, Robert J., Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment (2004). Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1160474

David D. Haddock

Northwestern University - School of Law and Department of Economics ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Robert J. Miller (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
4809654085 (Phone)

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