Who Owns the Largest Firms Around the World?

International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, No. 21, pp. 93-111, 2008

19 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2008 Last revised: 10 Apr 2012

See all articles by Paulo F. Pereira Alves

Paulo F. Pereira Alves

CMVM - Portuguese Securities and Exchange Commission, ISCAL and Lusofona University

Miguel A. Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: June 23, 2008

Abstract

In this research paper we evaluate how corporate control around the world is defined and which variables, related to a firm's characteristics and the countries' infrastructures, influences this. We find that there is a small number of countries where firms are widely held. The role of financial institutions seems to be different in civil and common law-based countries. While they seem to act as a monitor of management in common law-based countries, in civil law countries they act as a monitor of large shareholders. Finally, we find that firm's size is the most important determinant of ultimate owners.

Keywords: Corporate ownership, Pyramidal structures

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Pereira Alves, Paulo F. and Ferreira, Miguel Almeida, Who Owns the Largest Firms Around the World? (June 23, 2008). International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, No. 21, pp. 93-111, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1150143

Paulo F. Pereira Alves

CMVM - Portuguese Securities and Exchange Commission, ISCAL and Lusofona University ( email )

Rua Laura Alves n.º 4 Apartado 14258
Lisbon
Portugal

Miguel Almeida Ferreira (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
149
Abstract Views
1,083
rank
240,337
PlumX Metrics