Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets

Posted: 17 Jun 2008

See all articles by GianCarlo Moschini

GianCarlo Moschini

Iowa State University - Department of Economics

Luisa Menapace

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Daniel Pick

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS)

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Abstract

The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the (constrained) first best. The main beneficiaries are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.

Suggested Citation

Moschini, GianCarlo and Menapace, Luisa and Pick, Daniel, Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 794-812, August 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1146686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01142.x

GianCarlo Moschini (Contact Author)

Iowa State University - Department of Economics ( email )

260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States

Luisa Menapace

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Daniel Pick

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS) ( email )

355 E Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024-3221
United States
202-219-0353 (Phone)
202-501-8517 (Fax)

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