A Minority-Proof Cheap-Talk Protocol

13 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2008 Last revised: 30 Sep 2011

Date Written: February 26, 2008


This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a universal cheap-talk protocol (a polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels) that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

Keywords: non-cooperative games, cheap-talk, correlated equilibrium, strong equilibrium, coalition-proof equilibrium, fault-tolerant distributed computation

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Heller, Yuval, A Minority-Proof Cheap-Talk Protocol (February 26, 2008). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105371

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

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