Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD

IBEI Working Paper No. 2008/13

23 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2008

See all articles by Christoph Knill

Christoph Knill

University of Konstanz; University of Jena - Institute of Political Science

Tim Balint

University of Konstanz

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2008

Abstract

In this article we investigate the reforms of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD by analyzing comparatively to what extent both organizations have adjusted their respective structures towards the ideal type of the so-called New Public Management (NPM). The empirical findings show that reforms towards NPM are more pronounced in the Commission than in the OECD. These findings are surprising for two reasons: First, it seems rather paradoxical that the OECD as central promoter of NPM at the international level lags behind the global trend when it comes to reforming its own structures. Second, this result is in contradiction with theoretical expectations, as they can be derived from theories of institutional isomorphism. To nevertheless account for the surprising results, it is necessary to modify and complement existing theories especially with regard to the scope conditions of their causal mechanisms.

Keywords: European Commission, Human Resource Management, Institutional Isomorphism, New Public Management, OECD, Organizational Change

Suggested Citation

Knill, Christoph and Balint, Tim, Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD (February 2008). IBEI Working Paper No. 2008/13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1104645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1104645

Christoph Knill (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz ( email )

Fach D-144
Universitätsstraße 10
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

University of Jena - Institute of Political Science ( email )

Institute of Political Science
Carl-Zeiss-Straße 3
Jena, 07743
Germany
+49 3641 945450 (Phone)
+49 3641 945452 (Fax)

Tim Balint

University of Konstanz ( email )

Fach D-144
Universitätsstraße 10
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

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