Learning Games

29 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2007

See all articles by Nobuyuki Hanaki

Nobuyuki Hanaki

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Waseda University-SILS

Eizo Akiyama

University of Tsukuba - Department of Social Systems and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: Dec. 1, 2007

Abstract

This paper proposes a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the identical game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs his personal view on the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show (1) when all the players are slow in learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but may enjoy higher payoffs than the cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one of the players is quick in learning the game, he obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all of them can receive lower payoffs than the case where all the players are slow learners.

Keywords: Learning, Subjective views, Computer simulation

JEL Classification: C72, D83

Suggested Citation

Hanaki, Nobuyuki and Ishikawa, Ryuichiro and Akiyama, Eizo, Learning Games (Dec. 1, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1042882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1042882

Nobuyuki Hanaki (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Suita, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Waseda University-SILS ( email )

Shinjuku, Tokyo 1658050
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://www.f.waseda.jp/r.ishikawa/

Eizo Akiyama

University of Tsukuba - Department of Social Systems and Management ( email )

Japan

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