Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

28 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2007

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

MIT

Date Written: September 2007

Abstract

We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

JEL Classification: C79, D82

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (September 2007). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1015247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1015247

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris

MIT ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
542
Abstract Views
2,748
rank
62,971
PlumX Metrics