Maher Said

NYU Stern School of Business

Assistant Professor of Economics

44 West 4th Street

New York, NY 10012

United States

http://www.mahersaid.com/

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS
Rank 49,020

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Top 49,020

in Total Papers Downloads

1,113

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 21,915

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 21,915

in Total Papers Citations

31

CROSSREF CITATIONS

15

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.
Downloads 344 (107,790)
Citation 1

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757R
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 16 May 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 220 (170,122)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 23 Mar 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 124 (278,270)
Citation 4

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Dynamic Auctions and Mechanisms, Random Arrivals and Departures, Changing Private Information, Incentive Compatibility

2.

Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6), 2419-2438
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 07 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 05 May 2013
Maher Said
NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 179 (205,805)
Citation 11

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Dynamic mechanism design, Indirect mechanisms, Sequential ascending auctions, Sequential allocation, Random arrivals

3.

Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process

Review of Economic Studies, 80(1), 1-34
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 05 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 05 May 2013
Raphael Boleslavsky and Maher Said
University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 141 (251,256)
Citation 4

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Asymmetric information, Dynamic incentives, Dynamic mechanism design, Long-term contracts, Sequential screening

4.

Sequential Auctions with Randomly Arriving Buyers

Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1), 236-243
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 15 Jan 2008 Last Revised: 05 May 2013
Maher Said
NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 117 (289,048)
Citation 3

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Dynamic markets, Sequential auctions, Endogenous options, Random arrivals, Stochastic equivalence, Symmetric Markov equilibrium

5.

Information Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 08 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 14 May 2009
Maher Said
NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 76 (380,576)

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Sequential auctions, Ascending auctions, Random arrivals, Information revelation, Dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Marginal contribution

6.

The Value of (Bounded) Memory in a Changing World

Economic Theory, 56(1), 59-82
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 23 Jun 2010 Last Revised: 09 Apr 2014
Daniel Monte and Maher Said
Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 75 (383,510)

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Bounded memory, Dynamic decision making, Partially observable Markov decision process

7.

Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 159, No. B, 2015
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 09 May 2013 Last Revised: 11 Sep 2015
Rahul Deb and Maher Said
University of Toronto and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 69 (401,428)
Citation 11

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Asymmetric information, Dynamic mechanism design, Limited commitment, Recontracting, Sequential screening, Type-dependent participation

8.

Evaluating Strategic Forecasters

American Economic Review, 108(10), 3057-3103 (2018)
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 18 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 08 May 2019
Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai and Maher Said
University of Toronto, Rice University - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 62 (424,256)
Citation 9

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Mechanism Design without Transfers, Forecasting, Learning, Election Predictions

9.

Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts

NYU Stern School of Business
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 May 2019
Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai and Maher Said
University of Toronto, Rice University - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 50 (468,573)

Abstract:

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buy-side analysts, career concerns, analyst recommendations, forecasting, dynamic mechanism design