Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management
in Total Papers Citations
auctions, lottery, charity
Bertrand, supermodularity, market entry and exit, limit pricing, Stackelberg
innovation, patents, buyouts, prizes, mechanism design
directed search, hetergogenous buyers, efficiency, auctions, competing mechanisms
collusion, directed search, auctions
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
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buyout, innovation, mechanism design, patents
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $42.00 .
File name: j-2354.pdf
Dynamic Matching and Bargaining, Decentralized Markets, Foundations of Competitive Equilibrium, Search Theory, Learning
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