Leonardo Felli

University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics

Professor

Austin Robinson Building

Sidgwick Avenue

Cambridge, CB3 9DD

United Kingdom

http://www.felli.info

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics

    • Email
    • Tel: +44 1223 335221
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

39

DOWNLOADS
Rank 10,297

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 10,297

in Total Papers Downloads

5,731

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 3,094

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 3,094

in Total Papers Citations

101

CROSSREF CITATIONS

337

Scholarly Papers (39)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

Ex-Ante Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 08 Jan 1997
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 651 (49,890)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

2.

Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

Downloads 487 ( 71,969)

Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2921
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 02 Feb 2010
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli and Leeat Yariv
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Princeton University
Downloads 483 (71,967)

Abstract:

Loading...

child adoption, gender bias, racial bias, search, matching

Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7647
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 08 Feb 2010
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli and Leeat Yariv
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Princeton University
Downloads 4 (780,683)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Child Adoption, Gender Bias, Matching, Racial Bias, Search

3.

Costly Contingent Contracts

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 13 Nov 1996
Leonardo Felli and Luca Anderlini
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 440 (81,302)

Abstract:

Loading...

4.

How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 30 Mar 2000
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 406 (89,355)

Abstract:

Loading...

Bankruptcy, control stakes, auction

5.

Statute Law or Case Law?

Downloads 367 (100,339)
Citation 10

Statute Law or Case Law?

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 22 Jul 2008 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 165 (221,135)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Loading...

Statute Law or Case Law?

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2358
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 139 (255,220)

Abstract:

Loading...

statute law, case law, flexibility, rigidity, time-inconsistency, precedents

Statute Law or Case Law?

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE528
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 13 May 2009
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 62 (430,528)

Abstract:

Loading...

Statute Law or Case Law?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6912
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Aug 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 1 (813,745)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Case Law, Flexibility, Incomplete Laws, Precedents, Rigidity, Statute Law, Time-Inconsistency

6.

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (Second Version)

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C02-4, PIER Working Paper No. 06-001 , Univ. of Pennsylvania, Institue for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-15, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Acces, September 2006
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Jun 2006
Leonardo Felli, Luca Anderlini and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 363 (101,633)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

courts of law, unforeseen contingencies, precedents, incentives, insurance

7.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Downloads 359 (102,915)
Citation 11

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

CESifo Working Paper No. 1847, PIER Working Paper No. 03-026, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-30
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 11 Nov 2003
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 293 (127,617)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

optimal courts, informational externalities, ex-ante welfare

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

PIER Working Paper No. 09-004
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 26 Jan 2009
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 42 (513,390)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 11 Feb 2004
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (619,475)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal courts, informational externalities, parties' ex-ante welfare

8.

Endogenous Lobbying

Downloads 223 (168,509)
Citation 22

Endogenous Lobbying

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 19 Apr 2000
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 185 (200,114)

Abstract:

Loading...

Lobbying, citizen-candidate, representative democracy, electoral competition

Endogenous Lobbying

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE448
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 20 (649,269)

Abstract:

Loading...

Endogenous Lobbying

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 14 Feb 2002
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 18 (664,713)
Citation 4
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Endogenous lobbying, citizen-candidate model, representative democracy

9.

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Downloads 202 (184,937)
Citation 36

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

CARESS Working Paper No. 00-04
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 02 Jun 2000
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 134 (262,700)
Citation 30

Abstract:

Loading...

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE414
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 39 (528,320)

Abstract:

Loading...

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 13 Oct 2002
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 29 (585,040)
Citation 5
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Hold-up problem, competition, matching, specific investments

Does Competition Solve the Hold‐Up Problem?

Economica, Vol. 83, Issue 329, pp. 172-200, 2016
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 18 Jan 2016
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

10.

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

Downloads 200 (186,643)
Citation 12

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 213
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 02 Nov 1999
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 179 (206,053)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Optional bargaining costs, inefficient bargaining outcomes, renegotiation, imperfect recall

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE361
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 21 (641,600)

Abstract:

Loading...

11.

Trust, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5229
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 12 Mar 2015
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 197 (189,197)

Abstract:

Loading...

trust, hold-up problem, competition, innovation, specific investment, procurement, relational contracts, management practices, suppliers, car manufacturers, German automotive industry

12.

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

Downloads 186 (199,187)
Citation 1

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3358
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Feb 2011
Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen and Konrad O. Stahl
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 121 (283,780)

Abstract:

Loading...

trust, hold-up problem, competition, specific investment, suppliers, car manufacturers, German automotive industry

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 11-072
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen and Konrad O. Stahl
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 64 (423,448)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Trust, Hold-up problem, Competition, Specifi c investment, Suppliers, Car manufacturers, German automotive industry

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8265
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 Mar 2011
Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen and Konrad O. Stahl
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (813,745)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Car manufacturers, Competition, German automotive industry, Hold-up problem, Specific investment, Suppliers, Trust

13.

Competition and Hold-Ups

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 12 Aug 1999
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 186 (199,187)

Abstract:

Loading...

14.

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

Downloads 145 (245,935)
Citation 7

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3489
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Jun 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Giovanni Immordino and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 143 (249,406)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

legal system, commitment, flexibility, innovation, growth

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8433
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 16 Jun 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Giovanni Immordino and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 1 (813,745)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Commitment, Flexibility, Growth, Innovation, Legal System

Legal Institutions, Innovation, and Growth

International Economic Review, Vol. 54, Issue 3, pp. 937-956, 2013
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 18 Jul 2013
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Giovanni Immordino and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 1 (813,745)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

15.

Undescribable Events

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Jan 2004
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 132 (264,690)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

undescribable events, incomplete contracts, finite invariance, fine variability.

16.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 06-024, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-24
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 20 Oct 2006
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 127 (272,461)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare

17.

Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5343
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 19 May 2015
Leonardo Felli and Rafael Hortala-Vallve
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government
Downloads 120 (284,241)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

collusion, blackmail, whistle-blowing and communication

18.

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

Downloads 104 (313,891)
Citation 10

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

PIER Working Paper No. 06-025, CESifo Working Paper No. 1852
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Oct 2006
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 77 (382,174)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-ante Welfare, Informed Principal, Menu Contracts

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE511
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (598,248)

Abstract:

Loading...

19.

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 19 Feb 2001
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 99 (324,248)

Abstract:

Loading...

20.

Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 12 Apr 1998
Leonardo Felli and François Ortalo-Magné
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Wisconsin School of Business
Downloads 99 (324,248)

Abstract:

Loading...

21.

Why Stare Decisis?

Downloads 81 (367,292)
Citation 7

Why Stare Decisis?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 May 2010
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 76 (385,048)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

C79, D74, D89, K40, L14.

Why Stare Decisis?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8266
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 Mar 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 5 (772,313)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Case Law, Precedents, Stare Decisis, Time-Inconsistency

22.

Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE407
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 79 (372,710)

Abstract:

Loading...

23.

Endogenous Lobbying, Second Version

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 Dec 2004
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 79 (372,710)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Lobbying, citizen-candidate, representative democracy, electoral competition

24.

Firm-Specific Training

Downloads 78 (375,424)
Citation 1

Firm-Specific Training

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE473
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics
Downloads 61 (434,125)

Abstract:

Loading...

Firm-Specific Training

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 19 Oct 2004
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics
Downloads 17 (672,441)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Firm-specific training, productivity-enhancement, employee evaluation, firm-specific human capital

Firm-Specific Training

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12748
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 26 Feb 2018
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Specific human capital; Training; Learning-by-doing; Turnover; Productivity enhancement; Employee evaluation

25.

Unforeseen Contingencies

Downloads 71 (395,675)

Unforeseen Contingencies

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE431
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 43 (508,629)

Abstract:

Loading...

Unforeseen Contingencies

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 18 Apr 2002
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 28 (591,606)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Unforeseen contingencies, incomplete contracts, finite invariance, fine variability

26.

Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE409
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 58 (438,810)

Abstract:

Loading...

27.

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Downloads 53 (457,276)
Citation 10

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE447
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (544,028)

Abstract:

Loading...

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 14 Jun 2001
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 17 (672,441)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal courts, unforeseen contingencies, risk, incentives

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 662-684, 2007
Posted: 23 Jun 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

28.

Costly Coasian Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE362
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 48 (477,021)

Abstract:

Loading...

29.

How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 31 Jul 2001
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 26 (588,207)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bankruptcy, auctions, transfer of control, private benefits

30.

Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race

NBER Working Paper No. w16444
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 12 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 07 Jun 2021
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli and Leeat Yariv
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Princeton University
Downloads 24 (601,174)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

31.

Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

Downloads 19 (635,414)

Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CESifo Working Paper No. 7680
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 25 Jul 2019
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 18 (664,713)

Abstract:

Loading...

relational contracts, hold-up, buyer-supplier contracts, bargaining power

Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13750
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 30 May 2019
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (813,745)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bargaining power, Buyer-Supplier Contracts, hold-up, Relational Contracts

32.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? this Paper Replaces Te/2003/464

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE510
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 18 (642,498)

Abstract:

Loading...

33.

Preventing Collusion Through Discretion

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8302
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 28 Mar 2011
Leonardo Felli and Rafael Hortala-Vallve
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government
Downloads 4 (748,762)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Collusion, Communication, Delegation, Hierarchies

34.

Costly Pretrial Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13074
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 31 Jul 2018
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Giovanni Immordino
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)
Downloads 0 (794,867)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Costly Negotiations, Court Litigation, Pretrial Agreements

35.

Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12267
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 11 Sep 2017
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, ARC Econ GmbH, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (794,867)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Competition, Hold-up Problem, Innovation, Management Practices, Procurement, Relational Contracts, Specific Investment, Supply Chains, Trust

36.

Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 453-483, 2000
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 26 Sep 2012
Leonardo Felli and J. Miguel Villas‐Boas
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 0 (794,867)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

37.

Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy

Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Working Paper No. 018-98
Posted: 19 Aug 1998
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

38.

Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 104, No. 4, August 1996
Posted: 21 May 1998
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

39.

'Friendships' in Vertical Relations

Posted: 06 Nov 1996
Leonardo Felli and J. Miguel Villas-Boas
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of California, Berkeley

Abstract:

Loading...