Leicester, LE1 7RH
University of Leicester
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corruption, political instability, voting behavior
Lindahl allocation, political competition, political rents, voting games
corruption, financial openness, ideology, politicians
Lindahl allocation, political competition, voting games
adverse selection, first-best, full implementation, mechanism design, single-crossing property
control structure, delegation, efficiency wage, entrepreneur, managerial contract, moral hazard, organizational hierarchy, private benefits
electoral incentives, signaling, voting
Democracy, Economic Literacy, Expert Advice, Populism
elections, polarization, strategic delegation, bureaucracy, foreign influence
ex-ante welfare, financial claims, renegotiation, renegotiation-proof contracts
capitalist spirit, general equilibrium, income distribution, income inequality, minimum wage, output gap, unemployment, wealth distribution, wealth inequality
contract law, development, enforcement institutions, hold-up, institutional agent, regulation, social contract
biased polls, candidate valence, information aggregation
price distribution, random-search models, real rigidities, search intensity, technological shocks
Implementation, renegotiation-proofness, incomplete contracts, hold- up, contracting with third-parties.
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