Ana M. Albuquerque

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Assistant Professor

595 Commonwealth Avenue

Boston, MA MA 02215

United States

  • Boston University - Questrom School of Business

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    • Tel: 617-358-4185
    • Fax: 617-353-6667
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

12

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4,972

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 18,715

in Total Papers Citations

47

CROSSREF CITATIONS

8

Scholarly Papers (12)

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1.

Peer Choice in CEO Compensation

Downloads 1,344 ( 17,150)
Citation 17

Peer Choice in CEO Compensation

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 14 Sep 2012
Ana M. Albuquerque, Gus De Franco and Rodrigo S. Verdi
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 1,344 (16,827)
Citation 16

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executive compensation, benchmarking, peer groups

Peer Choice in CEO Compensation

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2146185
Posted: 14 Sep 2012
Ana M. Albuquerque, Gus De Franco and Rodrigo S. Verdi
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

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Executive compensation, benchmarking, peer groups

2.

Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 27 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 20 Apr 2009
Ana M. Albuquerque
Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 748 (39,862)
Citation 22

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3.

Has Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Discouraged Corporate Investment? New Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Management Science, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 09 Oct 2017 Last Revised: 17 Apr 2018
Ana M. Albuquerque and Julie Zhu
Boston University - Questrom School of Business and Fanhai International School of Finance(FISF), Fudan University
Downloads 584 (55,296)
Citation 4

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SOX, Section 404, investment, corporate risk-taking, regulation, natural experiment

4.

The Impact of Risk on CEO Equity Incentives: Evidence from Customer Concentration

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 14 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 20 Jun 2014
Ana M. Albuquerque, George Papadakis and Peter D. Wysocki
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Boston University and Boston University Questrom School of Business
Downloads 519 (64,083)

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CEO, Compensation, Major Customers, Incentives, Risk, Suppliers

5.

Do Growth-Option Firms Use Less Relative Performance Evaluation?

Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 11 Sep 2007 Last Revised: 07 Apr 2013
Ana M. Albuquerque
Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 500 (67,155)
Citation 6

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Executive Compensation, Relative Performance Evaluation, Growth Options

6.

The Impact of Risk and Monitoring on CEO Compensation

AAA 2011 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 22 Aug 2010
Ana M. Albuquerque, George Papadakis and Peter D. Wysocki
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Boston University and Boston University Questrom School of Business
Downloads 363 (98,145)
Citation 4

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CEO, Compensation, Customers, Incentives, Monitoring, Risk, Suppliers

7.

Are ISS Recommendations Informative? Evidence from Assessments of Compensation Practices

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 04 Jun 2020 Last Revised: 06 Oct 2020
Ana M. Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter and Susanna Gallani
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Boston College - Department of Accounting and Harvard Business School
Downloads 255 (143,260)
Citation 3

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Proxy Advisors, CEO Compensation, Say-on-Pay, Institutional Shareholder Voting

8.

Are CEOS Paid Extra for Riskier Pay Packages?

Downloads 253 (144,408)

Are CEOS Paid Extra for Riskier Pay Packages?

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper 697/2020
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 13 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 18 Dec 2020
Ana M. Albuquerque, Rui A. Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter and Flora Dong
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Boston College, Carroll School of Management, Boston College - Department of Accounting and Kennesaw State University
Downloads 252 (144,402)

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CEO pay, incentives, contract theory, risk aversion, moral hazard, participation constraint, realized variance, ARCH, Incentive Lab

Are CEOS Paid Extra for Riskier Pay Packages?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15243
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 12 Sep 2020 Last Revised: 15 Sep 2020
Ana M. Albuquerque, Rui A. Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter and Flora Dong
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Boston College, Carroll School of Management, Boston College - Department of Accounting and Kennesaw State University
Downloads 1 (792,527)
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9.

CEO Compensation and Real Estate Prices: Pay for Luck or Pay for Action?

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 08 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 09 Mar 2021
Ana M. Albuquerque, Benjamin Bennett, Claudia Custodio and Dragana Cvijanovic
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business, Imperial College London and Cornell SC Johnson College of Business
Downloads 156 (224,394)
Citation 1

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pay for luck; real estate prices; executive compensation; accounting returns

10.

Do Boards Exercise Discretion to Reduce Costly Ex Post Settling Up?

Boston U. School of Management Research Paper No. 2479330
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 13 Aug 2014
Ana M. Albuquerque, Bingyi Chen, Flora Dong and Eddie Riedl
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Suffolk University, Kennesaw State University and Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 139 (246,456)
Citation 1

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Management compensation, Pay-performance sensitivity, Ex post settling up, Cash compensation contracts

11.

Court Intervention as a Governance Mechanism Over CEO Pay: Evidence from the Citigroup Derivative Lawsuit

European Accounting Review Forthcoming, Boston U. School of Management Research Paper No. 2410212
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 19 Mar 2014 Last Revised: 21 May 2014
Ana M. Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter and Luann J. Lynch
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Boston College - Department of Accounting and University of Virginia - Darden School of Business
Downloads 111 (291,194)
Citation 1

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litigation, court intervention, executive compensation, investor protection, waste claim, Delaware, chancery court, corporate governance

12.

Ex Post Settling Up in Cash Compensation: New Evidence

Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Boston University Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 3404299
Posted: 20 Jun 2019
Ana M. Albuquerque, Bingyi Chen, Flora Dong and Eddie Riedl
Boston University - Questrom School of Business, Suffolk University, Kennesaw State University and Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Abstract:

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management compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, ex post settling up, cash compensation contracts