Kai-Uwe Kuhn

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

Professor of Economics

UEA

Norwich Research Park

Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ

United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Research Fellow

London

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

19

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39

CROSSREF CITATIONS

126

Scholarly Papers (19)

Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 15 Nov 2004
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy, Lexecon Ltd. and Lexecon Ltd.
Downloads 891 (30,920)
Citation 4

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Bundling, antitrust, foreclosure, software industries, Microsoft

Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Feb 2005
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy, Lexecon Ltd. and Lexecon Ltd.
Downloads 52 (455,651)
Citation 1
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Bundling, efficiency defenses, foreclosure, policy rules

2.

Closing Pandora's Box? Joint Dominance after the 'Airtours' Judgment

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 11 Nov 2002
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 621 (51,115)
Citation 3

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3.

An Economists' Guide Through the Joint Dominance Jungle

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 11 Nov 2002
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 580 (55,825)
Citation 2

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4.

Interoperability and Foreclosure in the European Microsoft Case

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 18 Sep 2007
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Downloads 509 (65,740)
Citation 2

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Foreclosure, Interoperability, abuse of dominant position, innovation, European Commission

5.

Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 14 Nov 2002
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 439 (78,758)
Citation 1

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The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Markets

Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Nov 2004
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 285 (127,113)
Citation 12

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Collusion, product lines, mergers, coordinated effects, joint dominance

The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Markets

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 15 Feb 2005
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 22 (616,452)
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Collusion, product lines, mergers, coordinated effects, joint dominance

7.
Downloads 272 (134,276)
Citation 4

The Comparative Statics of Collusion Models

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 08 Jun 2006
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Michael S. Rimler
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Xavier University - Williams College of Business Administration - Department of Economics and Human Resources
Downloads 233 (156,079)
Citation 4

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collusion, robustness, comparative statics, product differentiation, cross-ownership

The Comparative Statics of Collusion Models

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5742
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 23 Aug 2006
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Michael S. Rimler
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Xavier University - Williams College of Business Administration - Department of Economics and Human Resources
Downloads 39 (513,747)
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collusion, robustness, comparative statics, differentiated products, cross-ownership

8.
Downloads 269 (135,824)
Citation 2

How Market Fragmentation Can Facilitate Collusion

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 21 Oct 2006
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 245 (148,603)
Citation 2

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Collusion, Market Fragmentation, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, industry restructuring, deregulation

How Market Fragmentation Can Facilitate Collusion

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5948
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 03 Jan 2007
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 24 (602,142)
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Market fragmentation, collusion, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, industry restructuring

Bilateral Market Power and Vertical Integration in the Spanish Electricity Spot Market

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 11 Oct 2004
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Matilde Pinto Machado
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
Downloads 231 (157,397)
Citation 20

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Market power test, vertical integration, electricity markets, supply function equilibrium

Bilateral Market Power and Vertical Integration in the Spanish Electricity Spot Market

Number of pages: 64 Posted: 21 Oct 2004
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Matilde Pinto Machado
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (609,260)
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Market power test, vertical integration, bilateral market power, electricity markets, supply function equilibirum

10.

Capacity Constraints and Irreversible Investments: Defending Against Collective Dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl

CASES IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY: THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, B. Lyons, ed., Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 18 Sep 2007
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Downloads 157 (223,404)

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coordinated effects, joint dominance, irreversible investment, capacity constraints

Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4474
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 26 Nov 2013
Ying Fan, Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Francine Lafontaine
University of Michigan, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 74 (379,949)

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contracting, incentives, principal-agent, empirical, collateralizable housing wealth, entry, growth

Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1212
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 01 Nov 2013 Last Revised: 10 Dec 2013
Ying Fan, Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Francine Lafontaine
University of Michigan, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 53 (451,781)
Citation 2

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Contracting, incentives, principal-agent, empirical, financial constraints, collateralizable housing wealth, entry, growth

Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9728
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Ying Fan, Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Francine Lafontaine
University of Michigan, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business
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Citation 3
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collateralizable housing wealth, Contracting, empirical, entry, financial constraints, growth, incentives, principal-agent

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 17 Feb 2010
David J. Cooper and Kai-Uwe Kuhn
Florida State University - Department of Economics and University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 112 (291,185)
Citation 9

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experiments, industrial organization, collusion, communication, oligopoly

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7563
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 11 Jan 2010
David J. Cooper and Kai-Uwe Kuhn
Florida State University - Department of Economics and University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 5 (749,671)
Citation 5
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collusion, communication, experiments, guilt aversion, renegotiation, trust

13.

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 08 Nov 2009 Last Revised: 13 Nov 2009
David J. Cooper and Kai-Uwe Kuhn
Case Western Reserve University - Department of Economics and University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Downloads 78 (364,717)
Citation 6

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Collusion, communication, renegotiation, experiments, repeated games, trust

14.

Behavioral Sources of the Demand for Carbon Offsets: An Experimental Study

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 06 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 31 Jul 2018
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Neslihan Uler
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and University of Maryland - College Park
Downloads 59 (422,969)

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carbon offsets, public goods provision, externalities, double auction, laboratory experiment

Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets

NBER Working Paper No. w17172
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 05 Jul 2011
Christos Genakos, Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
Cambridge Judge Business School, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Downloads 25 (595,129)

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Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8502
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 12 Aug 2011
Christos Genakos, Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
Cambridge Judge Business School, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Downloads 3 (767,523)
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anti-trust, demand estimation, foreclosure, interoperability

Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets

Economica, Vol. 85, Issue 340, pp. 873-902, 2018
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Sep 2018
Christos Genakos, Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
Cambridge Judge Business School, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 2 (778,998)
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16.

Excess Entry, Vertical Integration, and Welfare

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4
Posted: 11 Apr 2000
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Xavier Vives
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and University of Navarra - IESE Business School

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17.

Product Line Decisions and the Coase Conjecture

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 27, No. 2
Posted: 19 May 1998
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Jorge Padilla
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Compass Lexecon

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18.

Market Transparency, Competitive Pressure and Price Volatility

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1472
Posted: 12 Mar 1997
Kai-Uwe Kuhn and Catalina B. Martinez
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

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19.

Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 28, No. 1
Posted: 26 Feb 1997
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

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