Journal of Financial Economics 101(3), 621-640, September 2011
Number of pages: 43
Posted: 19 Mar 2008
Last Revised: 19 Dec 2013
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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10,644
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Abstract:
Employee satisfaction, intangibles, market efficiency, underreaction, mispricing, human capital, socially responsible investing
Academy of Management Perspectives 26(4), 1-19, November 2012
Number of pages: 29
Posted: 08 May 2012
Last Revised: 19 Dec 2013
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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3,910
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Abstract:
Human relations, human resource management, job satisfaction, corporate social responsibility
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3,464
( 3,592)
Citation
77
Journal of Finance 67(5), 1603-1647, October 2012
Number of pages: 63
Posted: 18 Mar 2009
Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
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3,368
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Abstract:
Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, private saving, manipulation, vesting
NBER Working Paper No. w15324
Number of pages: 43
Posted: 08 Sep 2009
Last Revised: 09 Oct 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
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88
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Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7497
Number of pages: 45
Posted: 17 Nov 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
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8
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Dynamic Incentive Accounts
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Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, manipulation, principal-agent problem, private saving, vesting
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3,306
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Citation
3
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 433/2014, Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper
Number of pages: 66
Posted: 02 Jul 2014
Last Revised: 11 Aug 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, KFUPM Business School and University of Exeter Business School
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3,239
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Abstract:
Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, Socially Responsible Investing, Corporate Social Responsibility
NBER Working Paper No. w20300
Number of pages: 42
Posted: 24 Jul 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, KFUPM Business School and University of Exeter Business School
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Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10066
Number of pages: 44
Posted: 25 Sep 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, KFUPM Business School and University of Exeter Business School
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Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around the World
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corporate social responsibility, employee satisfaction, labor market flexibility, socially responsible investing
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Citation
26
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 385/2013
Number of pages: 54
Posted: 27 Jun 2013
Last Revised: 16 Oct 2018
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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3,246
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Abstract:
large shareholders, governance, voice, activism, exit, informed trading
NBER Working Paper No. w19573
Number of pages: 44
Posted: 25 Oct 2013
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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44
(488,127)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9708
Number of pages: 45
Posted: 28 Oct 2013
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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1
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Blockholders and Corporate Governance
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activism, exit, governance, large shareholders, microstructure, voice
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 23-50, 2014
Posted: 25 Nov 2014
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
Abstract:
Journal of Finance 62(4), 1967-1998, August 2007
Number of pages: 47
Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business and BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Financial Economics
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3,181
(4,184)
Abstract:
Football, sports, soccer, sentiment, mood, stock returns, behavioral finance
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3,110
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Citation
27
Journal of Economic Literature 54(4), 1232-1287, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 450/2015
Number of pages: 79
Posted: 13 Mar 2015
Last Revised: 10 Feb 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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3,061
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Abstract:
Executive compensation, contract theory, principal-agent problem, rent extraction, optimal contracting
NBER Working Paper No. w21131
Number of pages: 70
Posted: 04 May 2015
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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48
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Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10566
Number of pages: 71
Posted: 05 May 2015
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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1
(790,433)
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
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contract theory, executive compensation, optimal contracting, principal-agent problem, rent extraction
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2,922
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Citation
25
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 514/2016
Number of pages: 173
Posted: 26 Jun 2017
Last Revised: 03 Aug 2017
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance
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2,202
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Abstract:
Executive compensation, contracts, principal-agent problem, rent extraction
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6585
Number of pages: 169
Posted: 24 Aug 2017
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance
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670
(45,429)
Abstract:
executive compensation, CEO compensation, managerial incentives, pay-for-performance, corporate governance
NBER Working Paper No. w23596
Number of pages: 168
Posted: 17 Jul 2017
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance
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49
(466,138)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12148
Number of pages: 170
Posted: 18 Jul 2017
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance
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1
(790,433)
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
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Citation
23
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 379/2013, Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper
Number of pages: 65
Posted: 27 May 2013
Last Revised: 11 Aug 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business
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2,632
(5,657)
Abstract:
Investment, Short-Termism, Managerial Myopia, Vesting, CEO Incentives
NBER Working Paper No. w19407
Number of pages: 55
Posted: 07 Sep 2013
Last Revised: 08 Oct 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business
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44
(488,127)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10145
Number of pages: 54
Posted: 25 Sep 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business
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1
(790,433)
Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia
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CEO Incentives, Managerial Myopia, Short-Termism, Vesting
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2,581
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Citation
43
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 475/2016
Number of pages: 127
Posted: 13 Aug 2016
Last Revised: 08 Jul 2019
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Boston College - Department of Finance
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2,579
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Abstract:
Large shareholders, blockholders, governance, voice, activism, exit, microstructure, property rights
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11442
Number of pages: 102
Posted: 22 Aug 2016
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Boston College - Department of Finance
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2
(776,395)
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
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activism, blockholders, exit, governance, Large shareholders, microstructure, property rights., voice
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 7, pp. 2286-2315, July 2011, EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 41
Posted: 21 Dec 2006
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
University of Delaware - Department of Finance and London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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2,215
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Abstract:
Investment Banking, Persistence, Mergers & Acquisitions
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2,088
( 8,465)
Citation
9
Management Science, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 344/2013, Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper
Number of pages: 56
Posted: 19 Mar 2012
Last Revised: 11 Aug 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Emory University - Department of Finance
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2,070
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Abstract:
Asset sales, financing, pecking order, synergies
NBER Working Paper No. w18677
Number of pages: 43
Posted: 05 Jan 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Emory University - Department of Finance
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18
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Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9720
Number of pages: 43
Posted: 08 Nov 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Emory University - Department of Finance
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0
Financing Through Asset Sales
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Asset sales, Financing, Pecking order, Synergies
Journal of Finance 67(3), 933-971, June 2012
Number of pages: 58
Posted: 19 Mar 2008
Last Revised: 04 Jun 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
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2,029
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Abstract:
Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, market valuation, feedback effects, financial and real efficiency, merger waves
Review of Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 75-102, January 2011, EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 27
Posted: 21 Jul 2005
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Peking University - Department of Finance
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1,953
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Abstract:
Agency costs of debt, asset substitution, risk shifting, executive compensation, pensions
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1,832
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Citation
60
Europen Financial Management, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 486-496, June 2009
Number of pages: 13
Posted: 24 Sep 2008
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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1,607
(12,640)
Abstract:
Executive compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, rent extraction, optimal contracting
NYU Working Paper No. FIN-08-026
Number of pages: 13
Posted: 09 Mar 2009
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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224
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Abstract:
European Financial Management, Vol. 15, Issue 3, pp. 486-496, June 2009
Number of pages: 11
Posted: 27 May 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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1
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Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
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Citation
14
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 527/2017
Number of pages: 56
Posted: 18 Sep 2017
Last Revised: 30 Jun 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology - Department of Accounting
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1,791
(10,651)
Abstract:
Repurchases, M&A, Short-Termism, CEO Incentives, Managerial Myopia, Vesting
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12305
Number of pages: 47
Posted: 20 Sep 2017
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology - Department of Accounting
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0
The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives
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Repurchases; M&A; Short-Termism; CEO Incentives; Managerial Myopia; Vesting
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1,680
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Citation
13
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 437/2014
Number of pages: 69
Posted: 20 Aug 2014
Last Revised: 29 Aug 2018
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Washington, Foster School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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1,649
(12,166)
Abstract:
Corporate governance, banks, blockholders, monitoring, intervention, exit, trading, common ownership.
NBER Working Paper No. w20420
Number of pages: 58
Posted: 03 Sep 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Washington, Foster School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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31
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Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10119
Number of pages: 60
Posted: 23 Oct 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Washington, Foster School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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0
Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership
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blockholders, corporate governance, correlation, exit, trading
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1,541
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Citation
41
Review of Financial Studies, June 2013, 26(6), 1443-1482.
, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 319/2011
Number of pages: 66
Posted: 04 Aug 2011
Last Revised: 23 Oct 2018
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
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1,496
(14,141)
Abstract:
Stock Liquidity, Corporate Governance, Hedge Fund Activism, Blockholders, Exit, Voice
NBER Working Paper No. w17567
Number of pages: 48
Posted: 04 Nov 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management and University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
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45
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Abstract:
Downloads
1,515
( 14,128)
Citation
16
Review of Financial Studies (RFS), Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 440/2014, NBER Working Paper No. w20476, Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper
Number of pages: 58
Posted: 30 Aug 2014
Last Revised: 11 Aug 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Queen Mary University of London and Sungkyunkwan University (SKK) Graduate School of Business
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1,497
(14,131)
Abstract:
Voluntary Disclosure, Equity Vesting, CEO Incentives, News
NBER Working Paper No. w20476
Number of pages: 49
Posted: 15 Sep 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sungkyunkwan University (SKK) Graduate School of Business and Queen Mary University of London
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18
(643,727)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10144
Number of pages: 51
Posted: 25 Sep 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sungkyunkwan University (SKK) Graduate School of Business and Queen Mary University of London
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0
Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months
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CEO Incentives, Equity Vesting, News., Voluntary Disclosure
Journal of Finance, Vol. 64, No. 6, pp. 2481-2513, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-08
Number of pages: 35
Posted: 22 Nov 2006
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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1,453
(15,105)
Abstract:
Blockholders, market efficiency, myopia, short-termism, intangible investment, Wall Street Rule, voting with your feet
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 7, pp. 2395-2428, July 2011, AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 225/2011, EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-09
Number of pages: 37
Posted: 17 Mar 2008
Last Revised: 29 Oct 2018
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business
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1,444
(15,255)
Abstract:
Multiple blockholders, corporate governance, market efficiency, informed trading, free-rider problem, Wall Street Rule, voting with your feet
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1,403
( 15,994)
Citation
12
Review of Finance, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 380/2013
Number of pages: 51
Posted: 26 Aug 2013
Last Revised: 20 Oct 2018
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department and University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business
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1,366
(16,325)
Abstract:
Financial efficiency, real efficiency, managerial myopia, investment, disclosure, cost of capital
NBER Working Paper No. w19420
Number of pages: 46
Posted: 14 Sep 2013
Last Revised: 08 Oct 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department and University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business
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37
(521,860)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9637
Number of pages: 48
Posted: 09 Sep 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department and University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business
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0
The Real Costs of Disclosure
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cost of capital., Disclosure, financial and real efficiency, investment, managerial myopia
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1,241
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Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 12, pp. 4881-4917, December 2009, EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 42
Posted: 19 Mar 2008
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and HEC
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1,241
(18,897)
Abstract:
Executive compensation, multiplicative preferences, pay-performance sensitivity, incentives, perks, optimal contracting, calibration
The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 12, pp. 4881-4917, 2009
Posted: 24 Nov 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and HEC
Abstract:
D2, D3, G34, J3
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1,100
( 23,025)
Citation
52
Review of Financial Studies 24(8), 2822-2863, August 2011
Number of pages: 44
Posted: 31 Dec 2009
Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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1,051
(24,216)
Abstract:
Executive compensation, incentives, talent, market equilibrium, risk, assignment
NBER Working Paper No. w15987
Number of pages: 43
Posted: 17 May 2010
Last Revised: 08 Mar 2021
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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44
(488,127)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7836
Number of pages: 45
Posted: 19 Jul 2010
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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5
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Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
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assignment, executive compensation, incentives, market equilibrium, risk, talent
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1,033
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Citation
97
Annual Review of Financial Economics 4, 339-360, October 2012, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 323/2012
Number of pages: 41
Posted: 24 Dec 2011
Last Revised: 30 Oct 2018
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department
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950
(28,048)
Abstract:
Feedback effects, financial efficiency, market efficiency, real efficiency
NBER Working Paper No. w17719
Number of pages: 36
Posted: 31 Dec 2011
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department
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83
(353,591)
Abstract:
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 339-360, 2012
Posted: 04 Nov 2012
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department
Abstract:
Number of pages: 18
Posted: 29 Jun 2010
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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920
(29,824)
Abstract:
Strategic default, mortgages, incentives, behavioral economics, household finance
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Simon Business School Working Paper No. FR 16-01
Number of pages: 54
Posted: 15 Jan 2016
Last Revised: 24 Dec 2016
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Rochester - Simon Business School and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
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834
(34,210)
Abstract:
Financial Efficiency; Real Efficiency; Real Effects of Financial Markets; Insider Trading
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815
( 35,261)
Citation
26
American Economic Review, Forthcoming, AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 318/2015
Number of pages: 67
Posted: 21 Mar 2011
Last Revised: 29 Oct 2018
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
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779
(36,967)
Abstract:
Limits to arbitrage, feedback effect, overinvestment
NBER Working Paper No. w17582
Number of pages: 52
Posted: 15 Nov 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
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35
(532,292)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9917
Number of pages: 44
Posted: 02 Jun 2014
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics
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1
(790,433)
Feedback Effects and the Limits to Arbitrage
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feedback effect, Limits to arbitrage, overinvestment
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791
( 36,705)
Citation
4
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 442/2014
Number of pages: 74
Posted: 24 May 2013
Last Revised: 23 Aug 2017
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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778
(37,024)
Abstract:
Executive compensation, limited liability, options, risk management, relative performance evaluation.
NBER Working Paper No. w20542
Number of pages: 60
Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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13
(682,640)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10180
Number of pages: 62
Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
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0
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
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contract theory, informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation
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703
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Citation
2
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 439/2014
Number of pages: 81
Posted: 29 Aug 2014
Last Revised: 18 Mar 2021
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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697
(43,054)
Abstract:
informativeness principle, limited liability, option repricing, pay-for-luck, performance-based vesting, performance-sensitive debt
NBER Working Paper No. w20456
Number of pages: 22
Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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6
(738,951)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10143
Number of pages: 24
Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
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0
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
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Abstract:
contract theory, Informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15755
Number of pages: 77
Posted: 11 Feb 2021
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
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Journal of Financial Economics 102(1), 81-101, October 2011
Number of pages: 42
Posted: 08 Jun 2006
Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting
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641
(48,833)
Abstract:
Termination, liquidation, managerial myopia, ownership concentration, monitoring, leverage, private equity
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 320/2011, Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper
Number of pages: 55
Posted: 13 Nov 2011
Last Revised: 11 Aug 2020
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
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439
(77,669)
Abstract:
contract theory, complementarities, principal-agent problem, multiple agents, teams, synergies, influence
NBER Working Paper No. w17606
Number of pages: 40
Posted: 21 Nov 2011
Last Revised: 08 Feb 2021
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
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23
(607,203)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9559
Number of pages: 51
Posted: 17 Jul 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
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0
Contracting with Synergies
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Abstract:
complementarities, contract theory, influence, multiple agents, principal-agent problem, synergies, teams
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9747
Number of pages: 52
Posted: 19 Nov 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
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0
Contracting with Synergies
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Abstract:
complementarities, Contract theory, influence., multiple agents, principal-agent problem, synergies, teams
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447
( 76,729)
Citation
1
Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 444/2014
Number of pages: 39
Posted: 19 Nov 2014
Last Revised: 28 Aug 2018
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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435
(78,525)
Abstract:
Contract theory, principal-agent model, informativeness principle
NBER Working Paper No. w20729
Number of pages: 20
Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Last Revised: 21 Feb 2021
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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12
(690,645)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10279
Number of pages: 21
Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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0
The Generalized Informativeness Principle
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Abstract:
Contract theory, informativeness principle., principal-agent model
Number of pages: 38
Posted: 18 Feb 2021
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Auckland University of Technology, Audencia Business School and Auckland University of Technology - Department of Finance
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415
(83,007)
Abstract:
Investor Sentiment, Investor Mood, Behavioral Finance
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15756
Number of pages: 41
Posted: 11 Feb 2021
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Auckland University of Technology, Audencia Business School and Auckland University of Technology - Department of Finance
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0
Music Sentiment and Stock Returns Around the World
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400
( 87,391)
Citation
37
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 31
Posted: 22 Jul 2008
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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371
(94,617)
Abstract:
Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, closed forms, multiperiod contracts, multiperiod games.
NBER Working Paper No. w15545
Number of pages: 67
Posted: 01 Dec 2009
Last Revised: 24 Jun 2010
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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26
(586,121)
Abstract:
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7578
Number of pages: 69
Posted: 11 Jan 2010
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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3
(764,987)
Tractability in Incentive Contracting
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Abstract:
closed forms, contract theory, dispersive order, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, subderivative
Number of pages: 8
Posted: 24 Jun 2011
Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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269
(135,154)
Abstract:
Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, closed forms, multiperiod contracts
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115
(283,220)
Citation
3
NYU Working Paper No. FIN-07-022
Number of pages: 50
Posted: 03 Nov 2008
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and HEC
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83
(353,591)
Abstract:
NBER Working Paper No. w13372
Number of pages: 51
Posted: 10 Sep 2007
Last Revised: 17 Jul 2010
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics and HEC
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32
(548,944)
Abstract:
NYU Working Paper No. FIN-08-019
Number of pages: 46
Posted: 09 Mar 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Harvard University - Department of Economics
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70
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Abstract:
