Agathe Pernoud

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Landau Economics Building

579 Serra Mall

STANFORD, CA 94305-6072

United States

http://web.stanford.edu/~agathep

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS
Rank 34,660

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 34,660

in Total Papers Downloads

1,699

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

6

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

Distorted Investment Incentives, Regulation, and Equilibrium Multiplicity in a Model of Financial Networks

Number of pages: 67 Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 22 May 2020
Matthew O. Jackson and Agathe Pernoud
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 809 (37,172)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Financial Networks, Markets, Systemic Risk, Financial Crises, Correlated Portfolios, Default Risk, Networks, Banks

2.

Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 24 Aug 2020 Last Revised: 26 Mar 2021
Matthew O. Jackson and Agathe Pernoud
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 693 (45,976)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Financial Networks, Markets, Systemic Risk, Financial Crises, Correlated Portfolios, Networks, Banks, Default Risk, Credit Freeze, Bank Runs, Shadow Banking, Supply Chains, Compression, Financial Bubbles

3.

Credit Freezes, Equilibrium Multiplicity, and Optimal Bailouts in Financial Networks

Number of pages: 50 Posted: 12 Feb 2021
Matthew O. Jackson and Agathe Pernoud
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 138 (256,948)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Financial Networks, Markets, Systemic Risk, Financial Crisis, Networks, Banks, Credit Freeze, Default Risk, Financial Interdependencies

4.

Informationally Simple Incentives

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 04 Feb 2020 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2020
Simon Gleyze and Agathe Pernoud
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (434,724)

Abstract:

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Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Simplicity, Privacy, Independent Private Values