Ichiro Obara

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics

Box 951477

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

297

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 02 May 2001
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 122 (274,813)
Citation 2

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Equilibrium Payoffs, Perfect Monitoring

2.

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 05-024
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Rutgers University - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 72 (384,631)
Citation 1

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Communication, Informational size, Perfect Public Equilibrium, Private monitoring, Public monitoring, Repeated games, Robustness

3.

Mechanism Design with Acquisition of Correlated Information

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
Sushil Bikhchandani and Ichiro Obara
University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics
Downloads 68 (396,685)
Citation 1

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information acquisition, full surplus extraction, efficient implementation, mechanism design, Bayesian implementation

4.

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 11-029
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 14 Sep 2011
Rutgers University - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 35 (525,999)

Abstract:

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Communication, Folk theorem, Informational size, Perfect monitoring, Private monitoring, Public monitoring, Repeated games, Robustness