Pingzhong Tang

Tsinghua University

Beijing, 100084

China

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

DOWNLOADS

1,001

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 5
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 05 Oct 2020
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc.
Downloads 941 (29,037)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Dynamic mechanism design, revenue optimization, non-clairvoyance.

2.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc.
Downloads 60 (419,630)

Abstract:

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Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers