Renato Paes Leme

Google Inc.

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway

Second Floor

Mountain View, CA 94043

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

DOWNLOADS
Rank 14,658

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 14,658

in Total Papers Downloads

3,978

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 22,059

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 22,059

in Total Papers Citations

18

CROSSREF CITATIONS

26

Scholarly Papers (13)

1.

Feature-Based Dynamic Pricing

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 29 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 10 Mar 2021
Maxime C. Cohen, Ilan Lobel and Renato Paes Leme
Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, New York University (NYU) and Google Inc.
Downloads 1,497 (14,436)
Citation 18

Abstract:

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online learning, contextual bandits, ellipsoid method, revenue management

2.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 5
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 05 Oct 2020
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc.
Downloads 941 (28,949)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Dynamic mechanism design, revenue optimization, non-clairvoyance.

3.

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 28 Nov 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 565 (57,479)
Citation 14

Abstract:

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dynamic mechanism design, martingales, approximations, dynamic auctions, internet advertising, revenue management

4.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 21 Jul 2019
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 193 (186,334)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

5.

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Rita Ren and Song Zuo
Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc., New York and Google Inc.
Downloads 162 (217,010)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Auctions, Dynamic Second Price Auction, Bank Account Mechanisms, Internet Advertising

6.

Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions from Learning Algorithms

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 26 May 2016 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2016
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Google Inc., Google, Inc. and Google, Inc.
Downloads 142 (241,906)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Online Learning, Mechanism Design, Ad Auctions

7.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 114 (287,251)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

8.

Combinatorial Bernoulli Factories: Matchings, Flows and Other Polytopes

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 13 Jan 2021
Rad Niazadeh, Renato Paes Leme and Jon Schneider
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 88 (338,743)

Abstract:

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Bernoulli factories; Exact sampling; Exact simulation; Geometric combinatorics

9.

Dynamic Contracting under Positive Commitment

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 14 Feb 2017 Last Revised: 01 Feb 2018
Ilan Lobel and Renato Paes Leme
New York University (NYU) and Google Inc.
Downloads 72 (380,746)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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10.

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Dec 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc.
Downloads 63 (408,705)

Abstract:

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dynamic mechanism design, non-excludability, geometric method

11.

Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 05 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2020
Negin Golrezaei, Ilan Lobel and Renato Paes Leme
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, New York University (NYU) and Google Inc.
Downloads 63 (411,989)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Return on Investment, Performance Buyers, Mechanism Design, Online Advertising.

12.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc.
Downloads 60 (418,659)

Abstract:

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Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers

13.

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Aug 2020
Cornell University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc., Google and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 18 (622,975)

Abstract:

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posted-price mechanisms, eager second-price auctions, multi-unit, position auctions, online advertising