Steven Lalley

Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

Professor

Eckhart Hall Room 108

5734 S. University Avenue

Chicago, IL 60637

United States

http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/

  • Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

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Scholarly Papers (3)

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1.

Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy

American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 13 Feb 2012 Last Revised: 26 Dec 2017
Steven Lalley and E. Glen Weyl
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago and Microsoft
Downloads 10,867 (498)
Citation 26

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social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

2.

An Online Appendix to 'Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy'

Number of pages: 2 Posted: 08 Jun 2016 Last Revised: 26 Dec 2017
Steven Lalley and E. Glen Weyl
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago and Microsoft
Downloads 520 (63,821)
Citation 2

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social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

3.

Nash Equilibria for Quadratic Voting

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 30 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 18 Jul 2019
Steven Lalley and E. Glen Weyl
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago and Microsoft
Downloads 161 (218,007)
Citation 10

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social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading, Bayes-Nash equilibrium