Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
selling information, experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation
Information design, Price of information, Statistical experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Hypothesis testing
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experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation., selling information
evaluation, information design, career concerns, bandit experimentation, downward wage rigidity, up-or-out, internal labor markets
Attributes, Information Design, Mechanism Design, Private Disclosure, Call Options, Multidimensional Screening, Demand Transformation
advertising, attributes, call options, demand transformation, information design, intermediaries, linear disclosure, mechanism design, multidimensional screening, persuasion
cream skimming, matching markets, market failure, information design, calculus of variations
Experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Product differentiation, Selling information
Bayesian Games, Repeated Games, Communication, Folk Theorem
moral hazard, limited liability, contract theory
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