University of Bonn
in Total Papers Citations
revenue management, commitment power, dynamic pricing, fire sales, inattention frictions
Dynamic Signaling, Dynamic Moral Hazard, Endogenous Effort
Cooperation, Many Agents, Repeated Games, Unilateral Help
Cooperation, Many Agents, Repeated Game, Unilateral Help
Dynamic Games, Dynamic Signaling, Dropout Risk
Strategic Communication, Small Bias
optimal language, communication, information theory
Private Investment, Hold Up Problem, Price Dispersion
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $42.00 .
File name: IERE.pdf
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
private savings, Relational Contracts
Private Investment, Hold Up Problem, Pre-trade Learning, Price Dispersion
This page was processed by aws-apollo5 in 0.344 seconds