Stephen Morris

MIT

77 Massachusetts Avenue

50 Memorial Drive

Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

United States

http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

101

DOWNLOADS
Rank 861

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 861

in Total Papers Downloads

35,156

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 273

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 273

in Total Papers Citations

1,514

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1,508

Scholarly Papers (101)

1.

Global Games: Theory and Applications

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1275R
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 3,781 (3,289)
Citation 29

Abstract:

Loading...

Common Knowledge, Coordination, Currency Crises, Global Games, Higher Order Beliefs, Unique Equilibrium

2.

Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1406; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Imperial College London, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 1,663 (12,854)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Beauty Contests, Bubbles, Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Martingales, Public Information, Asset Prices

3.
Downloads 1,556 ( 14,249)
Citation 110

Robust Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1,149 (22,250)
Citation 34

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Common Knowledge, Universal Type Space, Interim Equilibrium, Ex-post Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies

Robust Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 May 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 407 (88,399)
Citation 32

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex-post equilibrium, Dominant strategies

4.
Downloads 1,530 ( 14,640)
Citation 75

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R3
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 572 (58,253)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 386 (93,976)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 334 (110,931)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Correlated Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Robust Predictions, Information Structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R2
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 238 (157,901)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11867
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 54
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure., robust predictions

5.

Expectations, Networks, and Conventions

Number of pages: 71 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2018
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University and MIT
Downloads 942 (30,158)
Citation 19

Abstract:

Loading...

networks, incomplete information, centrality, common prior, heterogeneous priors, network game

6.
Downloads 920 ( 31,228)
Citation 62

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 322 (115,451)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 211 (177,415)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 153 (235,976)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 134 (262,899)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 100 (324,690)
Citation 54

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

7.

Liquidity Black Holes

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1434
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 19 Sep 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 905 (32,017)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Liquidity, asset pricing, global games

8.

Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 03 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Atsushi Kajii
MIT and Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Downloads 901 (32,153)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Higher Order Beliefs Refinements

9.

The Wald Problem and the Relation of Sequential Sampling and Ex-Ante Information Costs

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 23 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2019
Stephen Morris and Philipp Strack
MIT and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 889 (32,751)
Citation 25

Abstract:

Loading...

Sequential Sampling, Entropy Cost, Information Acquisition

10.

Justifying Rational Expectations

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-04
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 24 Dec 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 728 (43,134)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Rational Expectations, Common Knowledge

11.

Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching Games

Santa Fe Institute Working Paper No. 97-08-072E
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 29 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 715 (44,115)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

local interaction, incomplete information, higher order beliefs, random matching

12.
Downloads 669 ( 48,226)
Citation 12

Information and Market Power

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 070_2015
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 04 Aug 2015
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann
MIT, Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and HEC Montreal
Downloads 368 (99,346)

Abstract:

Loading...

Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 05 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 226 (166,128)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 06 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 75 (388,385)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10791
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayes correlated equilibrium, demand function competition, incomplete information, linear best responses, market power, moment restrictions, price impact, quadratic payoffs, supply function competition, volatility

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13295
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

13.
Downloads 647 ( 50,371)
Citation 47

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 392 (92,296)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Information bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 18 Oct 2012
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 132 (265,887)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RRR, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 64 (423,774)
Citation 45

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Dec 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 59 (441,945)

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

14.

Higher-Order Expectations

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 16 Dec 2017
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University and MIT
Downloads 603 (55,280)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

higher-order beliefs, higher-order expectations, networks, common prior, heterogeneous priors

15.

Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1402
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 590 (56,750)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Heterogeneity, Uniqueness, Global Games

16.
Downloads 563 ( 60,277)
Citation 42

Communication and Monetary Policy

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1405
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 375 (97,496)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

Communication, Monetary Policy, Transparency, Common Knowledge

Communication and Monetary Policy

BIS Working Paper No. 123
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Dec 2005
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 188 (197,403)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

17.

Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1241R
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 14 Feb 2002
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 551 (61,806)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Loading...

Debt, Coordination, Liquidity, Common Knowledge

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 374 (97,496)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Nov 2004
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 175 (210,309)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

19.

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 542 (63,082)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 284 (132,028)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Interdependent Preferences, Higher Order Preferences, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Sep 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 102 (320,407)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R3
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 65 (420,343)

Abstract:

Loading...

Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 28 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 48 (485,945)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 25 (612,651)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

21.

Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1400
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 506 (68,866)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral Hazard, Financial Crisis, International Financial Architecture, Global Games

22.
Downloads 479 ( 73,675)
Citation 6

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 16-13
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2019
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 440 (80,836)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Equilibrium Shift; Global Games; Rank Beliefs; Fat Tails; Hysteresis; Equilibrium Selection; Multiple Equilibria

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 06 Mar 2019
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 39 (528,710)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

23.

Co-Operation and Timing

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-05
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 23 Nov 2000
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 466 (76,093)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

coordination, common knowledge

24.
Downloads 427 (84,339)

Abstract:

Loading...

Common Knowledge, Coordination, Communication

25.

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 415 (87,134)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

26.

Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 27 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 29 May 2019
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and Duke University - Finance
Downloads 409 (88,902)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

coordination, endogenous information acquisition, continuous stochastic choice, higher order beliefs

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 310 (120,198)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R, Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 May 2014 Last Revised: 22 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 59 (441,945)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 36 (544,442)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

28.

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1818, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 020-2011, ROBUST MECHANISM, D. Bergemann & S. Morris, eds., World Scientific, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 405 (89,708)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

29.

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 27 Nov 2001
David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris and Ady Pauzner
Iowa State University - Department of Economics, MIT and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 386 (94,769)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Loading...

Equilibrium Selection, Global Games, Strategic Complementarities, Supermodular Games

30.

Contagious Adverse Selection

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 001-2010
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 380 (96,526)
Citation 20

Abstract:

Loading...

31.
Downloads 380 ( 96,526)
Citation 1

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 215 (174,325)

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Iterative Deletion, Direct Mechanism

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561R
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 May 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 165 (221,320)

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

32.
Downloads 379 ( 96,828)
Citation 3

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973R
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 14 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 199 (187,499)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 067_2014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 127 (273,764)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief Free Rationalizatility

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 53 (465,110)

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

33.

The Cnbc Effect: Welfare Effects of Public Information

Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1312
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Aug 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 366 (100,726)

Abstract:

Loading...

Transparency, Disclosures, Coordination, Overreaction To Public Information

34.
Downloads 360 (102,987)
Citation 61

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 081_2016
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 02 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 359 (102,561)
Citation 60

Abstract:

Loading...

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

International Economic Review, Vol. 57, Issue 4, pp. 1135-1148, 2016
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Nov 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 1 (814,463)
Citation 9
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

35.

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 348 (106,559)

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Interative Deletion, Dominant Strategies

36.

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1423
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 10 Jun 2003
Hanming Fang and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 343 (108,709)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

Multidimensional Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, Allocative Efficiency, Information Acquisition

37.

Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 069_2015
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 May 2015 Last Revised: 05 Dec 2015
Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 331 (112,746)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

38.

Interim Rationalizability

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Drew Fudenberg, Eddie Dekel and Stephen Morris
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Northwestern University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 330 (113,087)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, university type space

39.

Topologies on Types

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2093
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and MIT
Downloads 313 (119,703)
Citation 29

Abstract:

Loading...

rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, universal type space, strategic topology

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 168 (217,912)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 37 (538,986)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 30 (579,098)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 28 (592,038)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 25 (612,651)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1 (814,463)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 6
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2027
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 229 (163,927)

Abstract:

Loading...

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 44 (504,233)
Citation 29

Abstract:

Loading...

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

42.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 265 (142,517)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Markov, bounded recall, purification

43.

Policy Conditionality

PIER Working Paper No. 97-013
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Stephen Coate
MIT and Cornell University - Department of Economics
Downloads 263 (143,615)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Policy Conditionality, Transfers, Policy Persistence, Political Economy

44.

Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 43-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 13 Oct 2012
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 238 (158,420)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

45.
Downloads 236 (159,702)
Citation 17

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 134 (262,899)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 May 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 102 (320,407)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

46.

Ex Post Implementation

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 234 (161,044)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Ex Post Equilibrium, Implementation, Single Crossing, Interdependent Values

47.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 228 (165,110)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Loading...

optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RR
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 185 (200,270)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RRR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Apr 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 42 (513,767)
Citation 51

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

49.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 224 (167,916)

Abstract:

Loading...

Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

50.

Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 075_2016
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 221 (170,095)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

market liquidity, risk-taking channel, runs

51.

Inspiring Regime Change

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 06 Oct 2018 Last Revised: 22 Dec 2020
Stephen Morris and Mehdi Shadmehr
MIT and University of Chicago
Downloads 219 (171,539)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

Regime Change, Inspiration, Leadership, Vanguard, Mechanism Design, Global Games

52.

Best Response Equivalence

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
MIT and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 217 (173,100)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Best Response Equivalence, Duality, Farkas' Lemma, Potential Games

53.
Downloads 215 (174,614)
Citation 2

Information and Volatility

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 056-2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 07 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 171 (214,640)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 03 Dec 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 44 (504,233)

Abstract:

Loading...

incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

54.
Downloads 214 (175,355)
Citation 9

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 126 (275,470)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 88 (352,682)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

55.

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 30 Jan 2003
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
MIT and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 206 (181,685)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Information, Potential, Refinements, Robustness

56.

Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 010-2011
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 200 (186,785)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

57.
Downloads 198 (188,486)
Citation 15

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928R
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jun 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 148 (242,644)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928RR
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 50 (477,483)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete information, Idiosyncratic shocks, Aggregate shocks, Volatility, Confounding information, Moment restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs, Bayes correlated equilibrium

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 158 (229,717)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 37 (538,986)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

59.

Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Jun 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 192 (193,776)

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-Post incentive compatibility

60.

Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 12 Nov 2020
Stephen Morris, Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi
MIT, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 188 (197,466)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Information design, supermodular game, smallest equilibrium implementation, sequential obedience, potential game

61.

Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 079_2016
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 06 May 2016
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and Duke University - Finance
Downloads 161 (225,610)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

coordination, endogenous information acquisition, costly local distinguishability, higher order beliefs

62.

Information and Interaction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2088
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 157 (230,504)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Networks, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

63.

Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 151 (238,033)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Electronic Mail, Common Knowledge, Coordination

64.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822R
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 146 (244,767)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

65.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 143 (248,861)

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

66.

Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2066
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 131 (266,404)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief-Free Rationalizability

67.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 129 (269,531)
Citation 16

Abstract:

Loading...

repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

68.

Redemption Risk and Cash Hoarding by Asset Managers

BIS Working Paper No. 608
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 01 Feb 2017
Stephen Morris, Ilhyock Shim and Hyun Song Shin
MIT, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 125 (275,965)
Citation 16

Abstract:

Loading...

asset manager, bond market liquidity, cash hoarding, global game, investor redemption, strategic complementarity

69.

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1600
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 122 (281,040)

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic auction, Rationalizability, Extensive form, Uniqueness, Strategic uncertainty

70.

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Apr 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 121 (282,732)

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

71.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 120 (284,423)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

72.
Downloads 119 (286,203)
Citation 1

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 119 (287,529)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 92 (342,732)

Abstract:

Loading...

Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 26 (605,716)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

74.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 116 (291,287)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

75.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 107 (308,159)

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

76.

Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 061-2014
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 24 Apr 2014
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 101 (320,353)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

common knowledge, higher order beliefs, timing frictions, Calvo frictions, coordination

77.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 99 (324,492)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

78.
Downloads 87 (352,062)
Citation 1

Search, Information, and Prices

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2224
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 19 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (549,979)

Abstract:

Loading...

Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information, and Prices

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2224R
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 15 May 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (549,979)

Abstract:

Loading...

Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information, and Prices

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-23
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 24 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 17 (672,966)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, \Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information and Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14521
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 25 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Law of One Price, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Bertrand Competition, information structure, price competition, Price Count, Price Quote, search

79.

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1628
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 17 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 87 (352,062)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Common prior, Correlated equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, Uniqueness

80.

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561RR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 79 (372,971)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

81.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 78 (375,669)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Markov, bounded recall, purification

82.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 74 (387,027)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

83.

Competition and Public Information: A Note

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2234
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 15 May 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 73 (389,923)

Abstract:

Loading...

Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

84.

The Robustness of Robust Implementation

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 002-2010
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn and Stephen Morris
Independent and MIT
Downloads 69 (402,124)

Abstract:

Loading...

85.

Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices

BIS Working Paper No. 692
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 25 Jan 2018
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 68 (405,250)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

central bank communication, market expectations, crowding out

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147R (2019)
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 04 Jun 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 32 (567,042)

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Reserve price, Revenue equivalence

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 31 (572,966)

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection

87.

Repression and Repertoires

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 30 Mar 2021
Stephen Morris and Mehdi Shadmehr
MIT and University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy
Downloads 60 (431,994)

Abstract:

Loading...

Repertoires, Contentious Performances, Repression, Leadership, Tactics, Regime Change, Mechanism Design, Global Games

88.
Downloads 60 (431,994)
Citation 2

Information, Market Power and Price Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2200, September 2019
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Sep 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 59 (441,945)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Price Volatility

Information, Market Power and Price Volatility

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15104
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Aug 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 1 (814,463)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Cournot Competition, Demand function competition, incomplete information, market power, price impact, Price volatility, Supply function competition

89.

Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 017-2011
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 11 Jul 2011
Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux
MIT, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 57 (442,784)

Abstract:

Loading...

90.

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 56 (446,456)

Abstract:

Loading...

First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

91.
Downloads 44 (494,574)
Citation 3

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2133
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 44 (504,233)

Abstract:

Loading...

Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12964
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction

92.

Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609RR
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 07 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 42 (503,489)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationaliz¿ability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

93.

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1846, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 30-2012
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 41 (508,081)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Robust mechanism design, Efficient auctions, Interdepedent types, Partial implementation, Full implementation

94.

Welfare Effects of Public Information

Bundesbank Series 1 Discussion Paper No. 2000,07
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 08 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 14 (671,937)

Abstract:

Loading...

95.

Countering the Winner&Apos;S Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13332
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0 (795,478)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

96.

Fiscal Stabilization and Exchange Rate Instability: A Theoretical Approach and Some Policy Conclusions Using Mexican Data

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 329-356, August 1990
Posted: 19 Apr 2006
Andrew Feltenstein and Stephen Morris
Georgia State University - Department of Economics and MIT

Abstract:

Loading...

Fiscal stabilization, Mexico, exchange rates

97.

Political Correctness

Posted: 01 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT

Abstract:

Loading...

98.

Contagion

Posted: 15 Jan 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT

Abstract:

Loading...

99.

Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited

Posted: 26 Oct 1999
Stephen Morris
MIT

Abstract:

Loading...

100.

Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information

Posted: 01 Sep 1999
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
Imperial College London, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

101.

A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2025
Posted: 07 Apr 1999
Hyun Song Shin and Stephen Morris
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and MIT

Abstract:

Loading...