Marcus M. Opp

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance

Associate Professor of Finance

SE-113 83 Stockholm

Sweden

Swedish House of Finance

Drottninggatan 98

111 60 Stockholm

Sweden

  • Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

19

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SSRN CITATIONS
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91

CROSSREF CITATIONS

129

Scholarly Papers (19)

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1.

Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 108, pp. 64-81, 2013, Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-05, Fama-Miller Working Paper, Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 26 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 11 Aug 2020
Christian C. Opp, Marcus M. Opp and Milton Harris
University of Rochester - Simon Business School, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and University of Chicago - Finance
Downloads 3,144 (4,535)
Citation 36

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Financial Regulation, Rating Agencies, Certification, Dodd-Frank Act

2.

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

Downloads 889 ( 32,739)
Citation 16

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 20-2
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 21 Oct 2019 Last Revised: 04 Nov 2020
Martin Oehmke and Marcus M. Opp
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 888 (32,301)
Citation 20

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Socially responsible investing, ESG, SPI, capital allocation, sustainable investment, social ratings

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14351
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 29 Jan 2020
Martin Oehmke and Marcus M. Opp
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
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capital allocation, ESG, social ratings, Socially responsible investing, SPI, sustainable investment

3.

The Aggregate Demand for Bank Capital

Downloads 634 ( 51,727)
Citation 8

The Aggregate Demand for Bank Capital

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 19 Jul 2014 Last Revised: 14 May 2020
Milton Harris, Christian C. Opp and Marcus M. Opp
University of Chicago - Finance, University of Rochester - Simon Business School and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 632 (51,284)
Citation 12

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Risk-taking, Credit-rationing, Composition of credit supply, Bank regulation, Bailouts, FDIC insurance

The Aggregate Demand for Bank Capital

NBER Working Paper No. w27858
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 28 Sep 2020 Last Revised: 13 Feb 2021
Milton Harris, Christian Opp and Marcus M. Opp
University of Chicago - Finance, University of Rochester and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 2 (800,938)
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The Aggregate Demand for Bank Capital

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14524
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 25 Mar 2020
Milton Harris, Christian C. Opp and Marcus M. Opp
University of Chicago - Finance, University of Rochester - Simon Business School and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
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Bailouts, bank capital, Composition of credit, Credit rationing, Crowding out, Institutional asset pricing, Non-bank competition, Overinvestment

4.

Target Revaluation after Failed Takeover Attempts - Cash versus Stock

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 15 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 05 Mar 2015
Ulrike Malmendier, Marcus M. Opp and Farzad Saidi
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 626 (52,634)
Citation 3

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mergers & acquisitions, synergies, misvaluation, revaluation, medium of exchange

5.

Regulatory Reform and Risk-Taking: Replacing Ratings

Downloads 453 ( 78,635)
Citation 8

Regulatory Reform and Risk-Taking: Replacing Ratings

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 13-03
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 17 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 03 Sep 2014
Bo Becker and Marcus M. Opp
Stockholm School of Economics and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 420 (85,194)
Citation 7

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Financial Regulation, Rating Agencies, Alternatives to Credit Ratings, Financial Crisis, Insurance Industry, Capital Regulation, Dodd-Frank Act

Regulatory Reform and Risk-Taking: Replacing Ratings

NBER Working Paper No. w19257
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 08 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 13 Feb 2021
Bo Becker and Marcus M. Opp
Stockholm School of Economics and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 33 (561,194)
Citation 2

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6.

Expropriation Risk and Technology

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 113-129, 2012
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 26 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 11 Nov 2011
Marcus M. Opp
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 326 (114,623)

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Expropriation Risk, Foreign Direct Investment, Dynamic Contracting, Property Rights, Self-Enforcing Contracts, Principal-Agent Models, Political Risk

7.

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Downloads 187 (198,407)
Citation 9

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 19-4
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 09 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 30 Sep 2020
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 122 (282,180)
Citation 2

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Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal-agent models, informativeness principle

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

SAFE Working Paper No. 218, Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 18-14
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 28 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 28 Sep 2020
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 65 (420,229)
Citation 6

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Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal- agent models, informativeness principle

8.

Rybczynski's Theorem in the Heckscher-Ohlin World - Anything Goes

Journal of International Economics, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2009
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 23 Jan 2010
Marcus M. Opp, Hugo Sonnenschein and Christis Tombazos
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance, Stanford University - Department of Economics and Monash University - Department of Economics
Downloads 183 (202,170)

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Rybczynski theorem, Heckscher-Ohlin, Factor endowments, Immiserizing growth, Transfer paradox

9.

The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements: An Indirect Tax Approach to Compensation Regulation

Downloads 165 (220,980)
Citation 5

The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements: An Indirect Tax Approach to Compensation Regulation

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 19-3
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Jun 2013 Last Revised: 23 May 2019
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 165 (221,267)
Citation 7

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financial regulation, moral hazard, compensation design, clawbacks, bonus deferral, short-termism

Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9877
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 02 Jun 2014
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
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Compensation design, Financial regulation, Principal-agent models

10.

Impatience vs. Incentives

Econometrica, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2015
Marcus M. Opp and John Zhu
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Finance Department
Downloads 154 (234,175)
Citation 5

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Oscillation, Cycles, Self-Enforcing contracts, Differential discounting, Dynamic contracts, Principal-agent models

11.

Tariff Wars in the Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods

Journal of International Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 212-225, 2010
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 24 Aug 2010
Marcus M. Opp
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 146 (244,717)
Citation 3

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Optimum tariff rates, Ricardian trade models, WTO, Gains from trade

12.

Private Information in M&A Transactions: Evidence from Withdrawn Deals

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 17 Feb 2015
Marlena I. Lee and Marcus M. Opp
Dimensional Fund Advisors and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 100 (322,396)

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Mergers and Acquisitions, Private Information, Medium of Exchange

13.

Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Removing Capital Requirements for an Asset Class

Downloads 65 (414,866)
Citation 7

Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Removing Capital Requirements for an Asset Class

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 20-6
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 25 Feb 2020 Last Revised: 27 Jan 2021
Bo Becker, Marcus M. Opp and Farzad Saidi
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 64 (423,666)
Citation 6

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insurance industry, capital regulation, regulatory reform, NAIC, risk-based capital requirements

Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Eliminating Capital Requirements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14373
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 11 Feb 2020
Bo Becker, Marcus M. Opp and Farzad Saidi
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 1 (814,249)
Citation 1
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Capital regulation, insurance industry, NAIC, Regulatory Reform, risk- based capital requirements

14.

Industrial Asset Pricing with Endogenous Business Cycles

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 29 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 17 Jul 2014
Marcus M. Opp, Christine A. Parlour and Johan Walden
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance, University of California, Berkeley - Finance Group and University of Lausanne
Downloads 59 (435,480)

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15.

Markup Cycles, Dynamic Misallocation, and Amplification

Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Marcus M. Opp, Christine A. Parlour and Johan Walden
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance, University of California, Berkeley - Finance Group and University of Lausanne
Downloads 42 (503,347)
Citation 4

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Oligopolistic Competition, Markup Cycles, Allocative Efficiency, Dynamic Games, DSGE Models

16.

Target Revaluation after Failed Takeover Attempts – Cash Versus Stock

NBER Working Paper No. w18211
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 07 Jul 2012 Last Revised: 12 Apr 2021
Ulrike Malmendier, Marcus M. Opp and Farzad Saidi
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance and New York University (NYU)
Downloads 36 (532,005)
Citation 4

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17.

Optimism and Self-Selection Models: Bias Externalities in the Rothschild-Stiglitz Insurance Model

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 10 May 2014 Last Revised: 13 May 2014
Marcus M. Opp
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 31 (558,452)

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Insurance, Self-selection, Optimism, Biases, Overconfidence, Contract Design, Asymmetric information

18.

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Downloads 25 (594,820)
Citation 2

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 24 Sep 2020
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 24 (619,777)
Citation 2

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Compensation Design, Duration of Pay, Moral Hazard, Persistence, Principal-Agent Models, Informativeness Principle

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13643
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 09 Apr 2019
Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 1 (814,249)
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Compensation design, duration of pay, Informativeness principle, moral hazard, Persistence, Principal-Agent Models

19.

The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15081
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 28 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 16 Aug 2020
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 3 (757,243)
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bonus deferral, clawbacks, compensation regulation, moral hazard, principal-agent models with externalities, Short-termism