1351.
The Generalized Informativeness Principle
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10279
Number of pages: 21
Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Working Paper Series
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
There are 3 versions of this paper
The Informativeness Principle Without the First-Order Approach
Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 444/2014
Number of pages: 39
Posted: 19 Nov 2014
Last Revised: 28 Aug 2018
Downloads
435
The Generalized Informativeness Principle
NBER Working Paper No. w20729
Number of pages: 20
Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Last Revised: 21 Feb 2021
Downloads
12
The Generalized Informativeness Principle
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10279
Number of pages: 21
Posted: 08 Dec 2014
1352.
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10143
Number of pages: 24
Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Working Paper Series
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
There are 4 versions of this paper
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 439/2014
Number of pages: 81
Posted: 29 Aug 2014
Last Revised: 18 Mar 2021
Downloads
697
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
NBER Working Paper No. w20456
Number of pages: 22
Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Downloads
6
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10143
Number of pages: 24
Posted: 25 Sep 2014
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15755
Number of pages: 77
Posted: 11 Feb 2021
1353.
The Investor-Entrepreneur Relationship on Venture Capital: An Agent-Principal Approach
Posted: 30 Aug 2013
Working Paper Series
UPTC - Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences
1354.
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11215
Number of pages: 42
Posted: 18 Apr 2016
Working Paper Series
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
1355.
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11276
Number of pages: 15
Posted: 16 May 2016
Working Paper Series
University of Cologne
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information
Economics Letters, Vol. 145, 2016
Number of pages: 5
Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Downloads
5
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11276
Number of pages: 15
Posted: 16 May 2016
1356.
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15567
Number of pages: 51
Posted: 23 Dec 2020
Working Paper Series
University of Würzburg and University of Cologne
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 184, 653-669
Number of pages: 49
Posted: 05 Mar 2021
Downloads
5
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15567
Number of pages: 51
Posted: 23 Dec 2020
1357.
The Role of Private Benefits in Information Acquisition
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 68, No. 3-4, December 2008
Posted: 17 May 2010
Accepted Paper Series
Ritsumeikan University - College of Economics
1358.
The Role of Product Differentiation for Contract Choice in the Agro-Food Sector
European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 251-273, 2010
Posted: 04 Jun 2010
Accepted Paper Series
Hanshin University and affiliation not provided to SSRN
1359.
The Simple Economics of White Elephants
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12557
Number of pages: 39
Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Working Paper Series
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences and Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI)
1360.
The Social Costs of Side Trading
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13872
Number of pages: 20
Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Working Paper Series
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
There are 2 versions of this paper
Downloads
15
The Social Costs of Side Trading
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13872
Number of pages: 20
Posted: 02 Aug 2019
1361.
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10180
Number of pages: 62
Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Working Paper Series
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
There are 3 versions of this paper
Does Improved Information Improve Incentives?
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 442/2014
Number of pages: 74
Posted: 24 May 2013
Last Revised: 23 Aug 2017
Downloads
778
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
NBER Working Paper No. w20542
Number of pages: 60
Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Downloads
13
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10180
Number of pages: 62
Posted: 06 Oct 2014
1362.
The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOS
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14839
Number of pages: 48
Posted: 16 Jun 2020
Working Paper Series
Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology and Technische Universität München (TUM)
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOs
Number of pages: 48
Posted: 22 Jun 2020
Last Revised: 29 Mar 2021
Downloads
87
The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOS
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14839
Number of pages: 48
Posted: 16 Jun 2020
1363.
Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10207
Number of pages: 33
Posted: 21 Oct 2014
Working Paper Series
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
1364.
Transfer Pricing OECD Anti-Abuse Rules on Intangibles Clash with Economics of Contracts. At Arm's Length, Who Has the Right to Intangibles’ Revenues When the Funder (Cash Box) of the Development Lacks Capability to Monitor the Developer's Activity?
International Tax Journal by Wolters Kluwer issue November/December 2017
Posted: 15 Sep 2017
Last Revised: 10 Jul 2018
Accepted Paper Series
Studio Musselli - Economic, Tax and Legal Advisors
1365.
Trust and Culture
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009
Posted: 10 Jun 2010
Accepted Paper Series
University of Wyoming
1366.
Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention
Posted: 09 Apr 2020
Last Revised: 28 Jan 2021
Working Paper Series
University of Chicago - Department of Economics
1367.
Uncertainty, Pay for Performance, and Asymmetric Information
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 400-441, 2009
Posted: 22 Sep 2009
Accepted Paper Series
Diego Portales University
1368.
University Startup Intensity and Faculty Quality
Economic Inquiry, Vol. 57, Issue 2, pp. 855-875, 2019
Number of pages: 21
Posted: 27 Feb 2019
Accepted Paper Series
Texas State University and University of Notre Dame - Department of Economics
1369.
When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana and the UK
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13057
Number of pages: 93
Posted: 24 Jul 2018
Working Paper Series
University of Oxford and Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
1370.
Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?
American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 162-208, 2009
Posted: 25 Aug 2009
Accepted Paper Series
UCLA School of Law
There are 2 versions of this paper
Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?
2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Number of pages: 64
Posted: 04 Jul 2007
Downloads
770
Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?
American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 162-208, 2009
Posted: 25 Aug 2009
1371.
Why are Bad Products So Hard to Kill?
Management Science, Vol. 56, No. 7, pp. 1161-1179, July 2010
Posted: 23 Jan 2009
Last Revised: 13 Jul 2010
Accepted Paper Series
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
1372.
Why Be Moral? Social Contract Theory Versus Kantian-Christian Morality
Journal of Markets & Morality, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2003
Posted: 15 Jul 2006
Accepted Paper Series
affiliation not provided to SSRN
1373.
Why Wages Tend to Be Lower in Worker‐Owned Firms than in Investor‐Owned Firms
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 89, Issue 4, pp. 563-580, 2018
Number of pages: 17
Posted: 14 Nov 2018
Accepted Paper Series
University of Bergamo and University of Trento
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